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Daniele Archibugi and David Held 
 
 
Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and Agents 
 
 
Twenty years after 
 
When at the end of the cold war and at the beginning of a new wave of democratization we 
suggested the idea of a cosmopolitan democracy (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Held, 1995), we were 
aware that we were pouring old wine into new bottles. The attempt to make world politics more 
transparent, more accountable, more participatory and more respectful of the rule of law had 
pioneers spanning from Immanuel Kant to Richard Falk.  Still, the idea that “democracy” as a 
concept and a practice could and should be applied beyond nation-states was somehow innovative.  
 
If we read the international relations textbooks prior to 1989, we may be surprised to note that many 
of them do not even contain the word “democracy”. When the word appears, it is generally in 
reference to the internal political system of states and certainly not in relation to the possibility of 
subjugating world politics to democratic rules. Even international organizations were mostly seen as 
purely inter-governmental bodies and the prospect of making them more democratic was not 
contemplated. The European Union, the first international organization composed exclusively by 
democratic regimes and with some germs of democratic norms in its modus operandi, was mostly 
discussed in relation to the limits it imposed on its member countries rather than in terms of its 
ability to deal publicly with trans-national issues. The state of the art was not very different in the 
realm of democratic theory. Most of the textbooks dedicated to democracy, including the first 
edition of the work of one of us (Held, 1987), did not contain any reference to the problem of 
democracy beyond borders. Many of these textbooks addressed in detail how decision-making 
within town halls, counties and central governments could foster or hamper democracy. But 
democratic theory ended at state borders: it had nothing yet to say beyond this level of analysis. 
 
Today the state of the art is substantially different: international relations and democratic theory 
both take for granted that “democracy beyond borders” is an issue to be discussed. Most of the 
recent international relations handbooks devote at least a chapter to the question of democracy 
within international organizations and of the impact of globalization on national democracies. The 
same applies to handbooks on democracy, which often devote the last chapter to the challenge of 
expanding democratic values to the international system.  
 
Of course, not everybody is convinced that a cosmopolitan democracy is needed or desirable. 
Opponents are clearly more numerous than supporters. Robert Dahl, Ralf Daharendorf, David 
Miller, Philippe Schmitter and many others have more or less politely declared that the idea of 
applying the concept of democracy beyond the state is premature or even naïve. However, other 
scholars, including Jurgen Habermas, Richard Falk, Ulrich Beck, Mary Kaldor, Tony McGrew, Jan-
Aart Scholte and Saskia Sassen have contributed to the development of this vision from a variety of 
disciplinary backgrounds. Moreover, the hope of cosmopolitan democracy has reached the hearts 
and minds of many young scholars, which are increasingly providing fresh ideas and sophisticated 
analytical tools. 
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The aims of the cosmopolitan democracy project have never been limited to academic discourse. 
On the contrary, the ambition was mostly to provide the intellectual arguments to achieve elements 
of transformation in the real world. It should be recognized that, while the academic discourse has 
been unexpectedly successful, the hopes to obtain a democratic transformation of world politics 
have achieved so far very modest results. In fact, most of the proposals put on the table in the last 
two decades have not been implemented; a fact that is not entirely surprising, given how long it 
takes to change and reshape institutions. A change in the rhetoric, at least, is perceivable: since the 
beginning of the 1990s, statesmen are less likely to justify their actions on the ground of national 
interests, while international organizations are now keener to be accountable not only to diplomatic 
circles but also to public opinion at large. It is difficult to foresee now if this change will remain a 
simple cosmetic coverage or if it might lead to substantial transformations. 
 
In this paper we address an issue that has not yet been satisfactorily discussed in our previous work: 
who are the agents that might promote cosmopolitan democracy? While we have elsewhere 
illustrated the reasons that justify the need and the possibility of a cosmopolitan democracy (Held, 
1995, 2010; Archibugi, 2008), and others have discussed its possibility (Koenig-Archibugi, 2010), 
we have not yet discussed the social, economic and political processes that may lead some agents to 
support the political innovations suggested by the model. We are well aware that political 
transformations occur because of a combination of idealistic and materialistic motivations and that 
both top down and bottom up forces do contribute to the development or obstruction of change. In 
the next section we single out a few areas were changes in line with cosmopolitan democracy have 
been debated, while the subsequent sections are devoted to identifying the top-down and bottom-up 
agents that could promote cosmopolitan democracy. 
 
 
Paths toward cosmopolitan democracy 
 
If we ever manage to achieve a form of global governance that embeds some of the values and 
norms of democracy, it is very unlikely to happen as a result of a single grand plan. It is, on the 
contrary, more likely that various changes and reforms introduced at the local, national, regional 
and global levels will together contribute to a progressive transformation of world politics, and that 
each innovation provides inspiration and encouragement for further changes. The idea of a 
cosmopolitan democracy was never intended to provide a closed recipe, but as a unifying 
framework for a battery of proposals and campaigns that, in different ways, aim to develop global 
governance in a democratic direction.  
  
Many ideas for reforming global governance have been debated by diplomats and activists, 
governmental authorities and nongovernmental organizations, businessmen and scholars, at the 
United Nations, the G8 and G20 summits, the World Economic Forum and the World Social 
Forum. Some suggest reforms to current international organizations and others argue for new ones. 
Some stress the role of social movements, others the need to give more space to selected groups of 
stake-holders. There are campaigns that insist on the crucial importance of legal institutions, while 
other groups suggest giving to the business sector a more prominent role in managing global issues 
(see Held, 2004). We do not consider this variety of proposals competing against each other. On the 
contrary, we tend to look at most of them as complementary attempts to move towards a world 
order that progressively encompasses at least some forms of democracy. We sketch below some of 
the areas where transformations have been advocated. 
 
States as champions of cosmopolitanism. – States can be champions of cosmopolitanism within 
their own borders. Most states have to deal with a citizenry with diverse languages, religions, 
ethnicities and ideologies. Each state has the opportunity to experiment with different forms of 
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political participation, and with those minority rights that have been advocated by multiculturalists. 
Many states, especially Western states, are also facing an increasing challenge from migration. 
Aliens have fewer rights than natives in most states and, with transborder flows of people on the 
increase, this is making accommodation more problematic and it is generating mounting internal 
tensions. A state willing to become a champion of cosmopolitanism should make an effort, where 
possible, to reduce disparities between natives and strangers and offer to aliens the political rights 
enjoyed by its citizens. The expression “cosmopolitan state” may at first appear an oxymoron, but 
cosmopolitanism is a set of values and practices that can be implemented by any political 
institution, including the state (Brown, 2011; Beardsworth, 2011). International institutions can also 
be a positive stimulus to induce states to introduce more progressive standards in this regard. The 
UN Human Rights Council, the Council of Europe and the European Union all have monitoring 
programmes that critically assess respect for minority rights within their member countries. 
 
For a democratic foreign policy. – One of the core demands of cosmopolitan democracy is to obtain 
a substantial change in national foreign policy priorities, especially those of the liberal and powerful 
Western states. A democratic state should use its foreign policy instruments to become a good 
member of the international community even at the expense of short term disadvantages. For 
example, consolidated democracies should support foreign political parties and activists willing to 
foster democracy in despotically ruled countries rather than those who might be more congenial to 
their own national interests. For too long democratic countries have passively accepted or even 
actively supported dictatorial regimes when this was in their interest. A new foreign policy doctrine 
based on solidarity among democratic forces is now needed. This does not necessarily mean that 
democratic countries should create new institutions to exclude other despotic governments, as 
suggested by the proposal for a League of Democracies (see Carothers, 2008, for an assessment). 
Such a proposal risks creating a further divide among countries and could have the paradoxical 
effect of creating international cohesion among despotic countries and the isolation of democratic 
movements within these countries. 
 
The reform of International Organizations. – International Organizations (IOs) embed some 
elements of democracy as they are based on treaties and charters, their actions must not violate 
international law, their operations are transparent to a certain extent and their activities and policies 
are accountable to their member states to a degree. But many of the core ideas of democracy, such 
as the principle of equality among citizens, are not applied. Most IOs started as clubs for national 
governments, but they progressively incorporated, often in a decorative role, larger numbers of 
stake-holders. As a result of the participation of the business sector and non-governmental 
organizations, IOs have managed to expand their authority and legitimacy. Yet, while plans to 
reform the UN and other IOs have emerged from policy debates and academic writings, they have 
not been implemented. The bulk of these proposals aim to increase the role and functions of IOs and 
to enlarge participation and accountability. Many of the reform proposals could substantially 
enhance the independent political role of IOs, making them something other than simple 
instruments of national governments. This would help make them one of the core institutions of a 
cosmopolitan democracy. Perhaps surprisingly, opponents of these proposals are not only found 
among autocratic states, but among democratic ones as well. 
 
Global judicial authorities. –The rule of law and its enforcement is an essential component of any 
democratic system. Cosmopolitan democracy supports the development of a more effective global 
rule of law, while remaining sceptical of the enhancement of coercive supranational powers in 
general. Several IOs, including the European Union and the United Nations, already have complex 
legal norms and embryonic judicial power. These bodies have a weak authority in world politics 
since they lack enforcement capacity. Nevertheless, if international norms and jurisdictions become 
more sophisticated, it will be increasingly costly for governments to violate them. There are at least 
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three aspects of the global judicial authority that should be taken into account: the emerging global 
criminal justice system, the need to reinforce legal solutions to interstate controversies and the need 
to provide adequate transnational administrative rules for both the public and the business sectors. 
 
Criminal justice. The creation of several ad hoc international courts and, above all, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) have generated new hopes to hold egregious criminals, including politicians, 
accountable for their actions. Indeed, the ICC is the most significant institutional innovation 
introduced in the post cold war era. Much could still be done to make the Court fully operative, and 
to induce all countries to accept its jurisdiction. But it is already possible to assess its first few years 
of activities (see Glasius, 2009). To date, the ICC has mostly acted on suspected African culprits, 
and on insurgents fighting against, and denounced by, incumbent governments (the case opened 
against the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is a significant exception). All investigations 
undertaken are well documented, but the coverage is still highly selective. There is the danger that 
the ICC will be perceived as an instrument of incumbent governments against rebels and another 
burden of the white man over the black man. Those who hoped that the ICC could also be an 
instrument in defence of the weaker against the most powerful have so far been disappointed. There 
is the need to balance the action of the Court to cover cases in which the crimes are committed by 
Western individuals. For these reasons, the operation of the ICC can be stimulated and reinforced 
by other bottom-up initiatives such as Opinion Tribunals, which may be selective and politically 
motivated, but are less influenced by diplomatic negotiations and could call the attention of public 
opinion and of the official criminal courts to cases that have been overlooked. 
 
Lawful conflict resolutions. Interest in the ICC has somewhat overshadowed an equally important 
problem, namely the need to address interstate controversies through legal instruments. The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the body within the UN system that should address these 
controversies, is highly underused mostly because it can be activated only when both parties in a 
dispute are willing to accept its jurisdiction. Unfortunately, this happens very rarely and too often is 
activated for relatively insignificant controversies. If we read the sentences and the opinions 
provided by the Court, we will have a much distorted view of the world history of the last 60 years. 
The Vietnam war, the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Iraq war, the legitimacy of 
nuclear weapons and many other key international controversies have not received any attention 
from the Court for the very simple reason that states were not willing to submit core case to its 
judgement. A major expansion of the global rule of law would require empowering the ICJ with 
compulsory jurisdiction, making the Court, not just a sort of “referee” among two states but a 
proper Tribunal (Falk, 1998). This does not necessarily imply that the ICJ would have the power to 
enforce its own judgements. But even in absence of enforcement, a judgement denouncing the 
behaviour of some states would have an important impact on international relations. And, again, 
this is a change that each state could implement individually; several states have already accepted 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
 
International administrative courts. One of the most relevant trends in international law is the 
development of judicial or semi-judicial authorities for administrative purposes and the business 
sector. Rather than using national courts, both public and private players prefer to activate elements 
of lex mercatoria (the global framework of commercial law) and to use special courts set up for the 
purpose of hearing such cases. This new network of judicial institutions is in fact replicating, at the 
global level, the functions of the state: namely, arbitrating in cases of controversy. At the same time, 
these legal developments show that there are some possibilities to obtain conflict resolutions also in 
absence of a coercive power of last resort. 
 
Citizens’ participation in global politics. – Cosmopolitan democracy advocates giving citizens 
political representation, in parallel and independent assemblies from those of their national political 
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institutions. There is a wealth of proposals aimed at creating this, but the most straightforward way 
to achieve it would be to create a World Parliamentary Assembly similar in composition to the 
European Parliament. Such an institution would be the natural and most effective way to help bring 
together the peoples of the earth, allowing them to deliberate on common issues (see Falk and 
Strauss, 2001). It is unlikely that such an organ would have effective powers (at least in the short 
and medium period), but even if it were simply a forum reflecting and deliberating upon global 
public opinion it could play an important role in identifying and confronting policies on world 
issues. This Assembly would not necessarily be involved in every aspect of global political life, but 
it could concentrate on the most relevant and pressing issues: for example, those with a high impact 
on global life (e.g. the environment) or those with huge political significance (e.g. major violations 
of human rights). On some occasions, the World Parliamentary Assembly could provide 
suggestions on what is the most appropriate constituency to address issues that cut across borders. 
Such a new institution would complement the UN General Assembly and could work in close 
connection with it. It could provide political representation in global affairs to individuals and 
collective groups that are so far deprived of it: ethnic or political minorities within states, stateless 
groups, immigrants, refugees and, more importantly, peoples who still live under authoritarian 
regimes. Its usefulness will not just be for groups at the margins of political representation:  
individuals living in consolidated democracies would also have the advantage of engaging with a 
new level of governance and representation.1 
 
Political communities without boundaries. – Deliberative communities are not necessarily based on 
a territorially contiguous space. There are increasing areas in which political problems are non-
territorial or involve stake-holders in very different capacities (Gould, 2004). Professional 
associations, ethnic communities, groups of citizens linked by common diseases or by strong 
economic interactions may be willing to address their problems through democratic procedures. 
Capacity to address these challenges is strongly limited by the current representation of interests in 
world politics, whereby most foreign affairs issues are addressed by national governments. While 
many of these specific groups have neither interest in nor the capacity to become a state and claim 
sovereignty over a given territory, they may nevertheless find it necessary to have a political space 
to address their problems that it is recognized by states and international organizations (Dryzek, 
2006; Terry Macdonald, 2008). The number of transnational actors that are in charge of specific 
domains is increasing, as is the number of administrative bodies involving both public and business 
members. Transnational movements for social justice have already experimented with many ways 
to link players across borders. 
 
Recognizing the importance of non-territorially bounded political communities composed of 
individuals with common interests raises a crucial question for political theory: who are the 
legitimate stakeholders? For good or for bad, the organization of political communities based on 
states provides a straightforward answer: it is the state that decides who the citizens are and how to 
represent their interests on the international scene. In cases of other forms of political 
representation, it will be much more difficult to assess who the stakeholders are. Who are the 
stakeholders of the oil industrial complex? We can name the shareholders of the oil companies, the 
employees of the industry, the consumers of the industrial society and the citizens of oil-producing 
countries, among many others. All of them are legitimate stakeholders, but this still leaves open the 
relative weight that each of these categories should have in the political process. In some cases 
stakeholders themselves will find the system of representation congenial to their interests, but in 
more controversial cases it is likely that they will need to rely on an external assignment of 
competences and electoral weights. A World Parliamentary Assembly may be the instrument that 
                                                 
1
 The Campaign for the Establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly has even prospected the electoral 
systems and the number of deputies of such a World Parliament. See http://en.unpacampaign.org/news/374.php  
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could minimize political exclusion providing political representation and also attribute competences 
and functions to dedicated functional areas where the relative importance of stake-holders is not 
properly acknowledged. 
 
 
Top-down and bottom-up agents of cosmopolitan democracy 
 
We have briefly discussed a number of areas and institutions that could make world politics more 
democratic. It is now important to ask: which political and social agents might have an interest in 
supporting these reforms?  Political change occurs when there are interests at stake and agents 
willing to mobilise. The question just posed can in part be answered by reflecting on those social 
groups that are today excluded from political participation, that find the traditional channels to 
access world politics insufficient or that feel strongly motivated to act in selected domains. These 
are the players that should have an interest in generating more democratic global political 
institutions. 
 
The dispossessed. – The first group of agents that could have an interest in minimizing exclusion in 
world politics and that have access to decision-making are the dispossessed, those that Frantz Fanon 
(1963) labelled the “wretched of the earth”. These are people concentrated in underdeveloped 
countries, with very low living standards, and that are more vulnerable to environmental, economic 
and political crises. A significant part of this grouping has also experienced major political 
instabilities associated with failed states. This group has also been called “the bottom billion” 
(Collier, 2007) but perhaps its number is even higher. It is a group of people that rely heavily on the 
support provided by international agencies and donors. The structural weakness of this group does 
not allow its voice to be heard directly in world politics, to reach world markets and often even to 
participate actively in the domestic politics of their own country. If its voice is heard at all in global 
fora it is because of extreme actions, humanitarian catastrophes or because other players report its 
needs and its opinions. International relief agencies and nongovernmental organizations call 
attention to the conditions of these people as they are not sufficiently powerful and organized to 
obtain it themselves. The dispossessed have even to rely on Western celebrities as their 
spokespersons.2 In principle, this is the group of people that could benefit most from a cosmopolitan 
democracy: within states the dispossessed obtained substantial advantages when they achieved the 
franchise, and empowering them with political rights in world institutions could be an important 
step in improving their bargaining power. 
 
Migrants. – Migration flows motivated by economic reasons are generating major changes in 
affluent countries. Most of these migrants move to countries that are not only wealthier but also 
with democratic regimes. Authorized immigrants are seldom guaranteed the same economic, social 
and, above all, political rights than the natives, while unauthorized immigrants can have no rights at 
all. This is creating an increasing discrepancy between the rights and the duties of these citizens. 
Immigrants are engaging in forms of civil disobedience such as the Great American Boycott on 1st 
May 2006 in the United States3 or the “Sans-Papiers” movement in France and other European 
countries.4 Immigrants are not isolated and they have often been supported by civil society groups, 
trade unions and other organizations, creating a social and political coalition supporting their rights 
(see Cabrera, 2010). The immediate target of these protesters is the government of the host country 
                                                 
2
 Paradigmatic cases are George Clooney as campaigner for Darfur and Angelina Jolie as Goodwill Ambassador for the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
3
 On May 1st 2006, immigrants in the United States boycotted businesses, shops and schools to show how important 
their presence was to the American economy and society. 
4
 The Sans-Papiers (“without documents”) movement started in France in April 2007 when a group of undocumented 
immigrants occupied the Church Saint Paul in Massy claiming their right to be regularized. 
9 
 
and the principal aim is to get their status recognized. But these protests go far beyond national 
boundaries: there is a more general claim towards freedom of movement that it does not correspond 
to the state only (see Benhabib, 2004). Most democratic states are also associated to IOs that 
monitor their human rights regime, including the treatment of aliens. Individual EU member states, 
for example, have often been reproached by the EU and the Council of Europe for unfair treatment 
of immigrants.  
 
Cosmopolitan groups. – There are already some collective groups that are already sociologically 
“cosmopolitan”. Some rock stars, football players and actors have not only become global icons but 
they already live in conditions that make national boundaries irrelevant to them. While these icons 
are the most visible cosmopolitans, they are certainly not alone: cosmopolitans are also made up of 
many intellectuals, businessmen, public officers and social activists. This group has periodically 
attracted the hostility of nationalistic and totalitarian leaderships and have often been called 
derogatorily “rootless cosmopolitans” (Kofman, 2007). It is not easy to identify the size of this 
cosmopolitan group and even less to what extent they simply belong to privileged elites. It is 
however possible to distinguish between two relevant analytical factors: that is, between having a 
personal cosmopolitan lifestyle and holding cosmopolitan values. The cosmopolitan democracy 
project needs more support from the latter than from the former.  
 
The available empirical evidence shows that as many as 15 per cent of the world’s inhabitants 
perceive their principal identity as post-national (either regional or cosmopolitan), compared with 
38 percent who privilege their national identity and 47 percent their local identity (Norris, 2000). 
Moreover, identification with the global identity increases among young people and among those 
with a higher educational level, suggesting that in the near future cosmopolitan identity might 
become considerably more important. It might be argued that it is the privileged elites who hold 
these cosmopolitan values, but this assumption is disproved by other empirical evidence which, on 
the contrary, indicates that the share of cosmopolitan values is spread evenly between elites and the 
population at large (Furia, 2005). The existence of cosmopolitan values does not, of course, 
necessarily translate into political mobilization, but if and when it does, it could resonate with a 
considerable proportion of the world population. 
 
Global stakeholders and global civil society. – Political mobilization in favour of a more 
progressive world politics rests on two important and often overlapping groups: global stakeholders 
and the global civil society. Global stakeholders include sectors of governance, networks and social 
movements, as well as other groups with sectoral interests. In all cases, these groupings do not 
necessarily overlap with established political communities nor receive a mandate by states. These 
stakeholders are very active and have considerable mobilizing and lobbying capacity which they 
can direct at both national authorities and international institutions. Often these global stakeholders 
are better informed, technically more competent and certainly more motivated to pursue their 
agenda than their national or international counterparts (Kate Macdonald, 2011). As might be 
expected, in many areas stakeholders have managed to secure key positions in decision-making and 
can even act as suppliers of global governance without an explicit delegation. In other areas, 
stakeholders are dispersed and less organized and their political contributions unheard or heard only 
in international fora when national governments are willing to support them. 
 
Mary Kaldor (2003) and her collaborators have also described and mapped another important 
player: global civil society.5 Global civil society is often the most vocal supporters of progressive 
changes in world politics, including the democratization of global governance and IOs reform. Non-
                                                 
5
 See the Global Civil Society Yearbook produced by LSE Global Governance since the year 2000 has produced a wide 
range of analyses on the significance and activities of global civil society. 
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governmental organizations and other players have become increasingly important in drafting the 
agenda of global politics and often also in delivering public goods in areas of crisis. Global civil 
society is, according to Kaldor and her colleagues, also transforming the canons of international 
politics, providing often more effective solutions to local problems than national governments or 
even international organizations and acting as a powerful counter-weight to traditional power 
politics (Kaldor et al., 2003a). This “politics from below” carried out by the global civil society is 
often pushing for a different organization of interest at the various levels of policy actions, local, 
national but also global. 
 
International political parties. – Several political parties have also a transnational affiliation. As is 
widely known, the loyalty to this affiliation is low and the political priorities of parties are largely 
dictated by national interests rather than by the parties’ international ideologies. Within the 
European Union, parties have a greater international coordination and this is associated with the 
powers and functions of the EU as well as with the existence of the only directly elected 
international Assembly: the European Parliament. In fact, in the European Parliament national 
parties are organized within European groups. This is far from reflecting a genuine Westminster-
style majority and opposition (see Hix, 2008), but it still provides a sense that, certainly at the 
European level, there are different options. The European example indicates that institutions do 
shape the ways in which interests are organized. It is therefore possible that international political 
parties could act as promoters of democratic reforms in the United Nations and other international 
organizations. The Socialist International (2005), for example, has already published a far-reaching 
document on UN Reform which urged member parties in government to actively support the 
proposals made. 
 
Trade unions and labour movements. – The labour movement is seriously challenged by economic 
globalization. The labour movement built its political power at the national level, when in alliance 
with leftwing political parties it managed to guarantee labour rights, labour standards and the 
welfare protection of the lower and middle classes. Ideologically, however, the labour movement 
always had an internationalist standpoint, as shown by its mobilization against many wars and 
colonialism. One of the most important challenges of the labour movement in the twenty-first 
century is to guarantee to the working classes adequate standards of living and economic and social 
rights in a global economy dominated by multinational corporations and the high mobility of capital 
(see Munck and Waterman, 1999). The labour movement’s mandate to defend wages and jobs at the 
national level is now in tension with notions of the transnational solidarity of the working class. 
This tension is reflected in the ambivalent attitude of labour movements towards trade liberalization 
and migration. Most trade unions have been actively involved in defending the labour rights of 
immigrants, but some of them have been hostile to uncontrolled trade liberalization and inflows of 
labour when these risk reducing employment and wage levels. 
 
How could the labour movement face a much better equipped transnational business sector? The 
differences in labour costs and labour rights at the world level are still so high that it is difficult to 
create an effective alliance linking labour interests in countries as different as Sweden and China, 
the United States and India. This issue has been addressed in the attempt to standardize and upgrade 
labour standards through the International Labour Organization and to prevent unfair trade practices 
through the World Trade Organization. Expanding from labour rights to other social and economic 
rights, and ultimately to political rights, might allow the labour movement to become a powerful 
agent in democratizing global governance. 
 
Multinational corporations. – Multinational corporations (MNCs) are formidable players and 
drivers of the global economy. A few hundred MNCs account for a very large share of world 
income, employment and technology generation and are also very efficient in lobbying to protect 
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their interests. To secure materials, to organize their production and to reach markets, MNCs need 
to overcome institutional barriers, including barriers to trade, capital movements and migrations. 
MNCs have also shown their capacity to shape global governance in line with their interests, as they 
have done with national governments. 
 
Some scholars believe that MNCs will always act against the democratization of global governance 
since can satisfy their agenda with lobbying or functional networking, rather than with transparent 
and accountable policy-making. This is certainly part of the story, but not all MNCs interests are 
convergent and often their agenda also needs effective and accountable global governance. In some 
core areas, such as telecommunications, transports, standards, crime prevention and law 
enforcement, MNCs require more effective, transparent global governance. In the area of business 
law and property rights, the lack of appropriate transnational jurisdiction often makes transactions 
less certain and more risky. In such cases, MNCs push for transnational legislation and law 
enforcement (see Crane et al., 2008). They are also making increased use of international arbitration 
and public or semi-public judicial powers. 
 
 
Effective combination of top-down and bottom-up politics 
 
The two sections above have presented two lists, neither of which pretends to be comprehensive. 
The first is a list of actions that can be taken to advance cosmopolitan democracy. The second is a 
list of the political and social players that may have interests in or ideological motivations to 
introduce greater transparency, accountability and participation in global governance. Of course, the 
various players do not necessarily have an ultimate and coherent agenda for pursuing the 
democratization of global governance; their agency is often dominated by mixed motives. Table 1 
displays the list, mapping the uneven and combined agency which might pursue cosmopolitan 
democracy. It indicates that the vision of a more transparent, accountable and participatory global 
governance has roots in current economic, social and political processes, and that the cosmopolitan 
project has social and political anchors. 
 
To what extent can the actions and the players mentioned in Table 1 be labelled “top-down” or 
“bottom-up”? The very idea of democracy rests on a glorious bottom-up struggle to make political 
power accountable. But this bottom-up process is not necessarily fostered only by bottom-up 
pressures. We know that the English, American, French and Russian revolutions, all fought in the 
hope of empowering the bourgeois, the citizen, and the proletariat, were led by elites. But, as Mary 
Kaldor has shown, political change also occurs using less imperative levers and that light ties 
among individuals, associations and unofficial political movements may generate snow-ball effects 
of unpredictable consequences. The end of the cold war and the re-unification of Europe provide a 
powerful example of this (see Kaldor, 1991). 
 
The cosmopolitan democracy project is shaped by this hope: it aims to analyse the current 
transformations, to identify the areas where institutional innovations are needed and possible, to 
foster linkages and to understand what the main political players require. It has not a fixed final goal 
since we are convinced that history will continue to surprise even the most optimistic thinker. And 
it adjusts routinely to the evolution of politics. It is perhaps this suppleness that is the very essence 
of democratic thought and practice. Today this needs to confront a globalizing society. 
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Table 1 - Paths and agents of cosmopolitan democracy 
    
Agenda for 
Cosmopolitan 
Democracy 
Agents of Cosmopolitan Democracy  
Dispossessed Immigrants Cosmopolitan groups Global stakeholders 
and global civil 
society 
International political 
parties 
Trade Unions and 
labour movement 
Multinational 
corporations 
Cosmopolitan 
states 
 Request of social, 
economic and 
political rights for 
immigrants 
Contribute to a public 
sphere to obtain from 
states to  respect 
cosmopolitan standards 
Social and political 
actions to guarantee 
cosmopolitan standards 
within states 
Instruments to secure 
citizenship within and 
beyond states 
Request social and 
economic rights for 
immigrants 
Pursuit of integrated 
markets 
Democratic 
foreign policy 
Request donor states 
to contribute to 
development aid and 
policies 
Actions to remove 
the causes of 
migration 
Request to apply 
consistent principles at 
home and abroad also to 
support democratization 
Ensure that foreign 
policy is transparent and 
accountable 
Press national parties to 
respect democratic 
standards and to support 
democratic forces in 
authoritarian countries 
 Tension between 
business interests 
and business ethics 
Reform of 
International 
Organizations 
Direct participation in 
relief and other on-
field activities of IOs 
Guarantee of human 
rights of immigrants 
and of the freedom 
of movement 
Pressure for citizens’ 
participation in IOs 
Active participation in 
IOs also to augment 
transparency and 
accountability 
Urge  members of parties in 
government to support IOs 
reform 
Enlarge IOs 
stakeholder when 
labour interests are 
at stake 
Interest in getting 
effective global 
governance through 
IOs 
Global criminal 
justice 
Protection against 
major human rights 
violations in deprived 
areas 
 Ensuring impartiality of 
official international 
criminal courts, also 
through the promotion of 
Opinion Tribunals 
Reinforce global 
criminal justice also 
through opinion 
tribunals 
Pressure to obtain adhesion 
and participation in the ICC 
of member parties in 
government 
  
Lawful inter-
state conflict 
resolution 
Minimize 
international conflicts 
and aim to peaceful 
conflict resolution 
 Public opinion pressure 
for a global rule of law 
Opposition to wars and 
to other forms of 
international coercion  
Press member parties in 
governments to accept 
compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ 
  
International 
administrative 
courts 
   Enhance timely and 
effective arbitration 
 Promote effective 
transnational 
administrative 
networks 
Promote effective 
and timely contract 
adjudication 
Citizens’ 
participation in 
global politics 
Steps toward political 
representation at the 
world level 
Activate channels 
for transnational 
political 
participation 
Campaigns to develop 
political rights and 
electoral franchise also at 
the regional and global 
levels 
Generate transnational 
democratic networks in 
specific areas 
Enlarge participation in 
world politics 
  
Non-territorial 
political 
communities 
Request direct 
participation in relief 
programmes & 
development aid 
Possibility to 
connect politically 
to their home 
country 
Organization of 
transnational public 
opinion 
Develop and self-
organize ad hoc 
democratic 
communities 
 Promote active 
trans-national links 
between employees 
Participate in trans-
border economic 
and political 
activities 
 
 
